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On 15 March 2019, right-wing terrorist Brenton Tarrant attacked two mosques in Christchurch, killing 51 and injuring 49.1 
He found inspiration in the manifesto and actions 
of Anders Behring Breivik, a Norwegian right-wing 
terrorist who murdered 77 people in 2011.2 Tarrant’s 
attack in Christchurch was unique as it lead to mass 
casualties and was livestreamed on Facebook as 
it happened.3 The latter represents a strategic shift 
from earlier attacks by right-wing extremists, who 
normally do not actively communicate their course 
of action to a wider audience.4 Additionally, in July 
2020, it was revealed to the public that Tarrant had 
conducted reconnaissance of the mosque area by 
using a UAV some weeks prior to his attack.5 This 
1. BBC News, ‘Christchurch Shootings: Brenton Tarrant Pleads Guilty to 51 Murders’, 26 March 2020.
2. Asne Seierstad, ‘The Anatomy of White Terror’, New York Times, 18 March 2019.
3. Graham Macklin, ‘The Christchurch Attacks: Livestream Terror in the Viral Video Age’, CTC Sentinel (Vol. 12, 
No. 6, July 2019).
4. Daniel Koehler, ‘Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe: Current Developments and Issues for the Future’, 
PRISM (Vol. 6, No. 2, 2016), pp. 84–104.
5. Patrick Gower, ‘Exclusive: Christchurch Gunman Flew a Drone Over Mosque Weeks Before March 15 Shooting’, Newshub, 
23 July 2020, <https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2020/07/exclusive-christchurch-gunman-flew-a-drone-
over-mosque-weeks-before-march-15-shooting.html>, accessed 23 July 2020.
6. Cheryl K Chumley, ‘German Police Thwart Neo-Nazi Plot to Use Model-Airplane Bomb’, Washington Times, 
13 September 2013.
7. Asaad Almohammad and Anne Speckhard, ‘ISIS Drones: Evolution, Leadership, Bases, Operations and Logistics’, 
International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism, May 2017; Conflict Armament Research, ‘Iranian Technology 
Transfers to Yemen: “Kamikaze” Drones Used by Houthi Forces to Attack Coalition Missile Defence Systems’, March 2017.
is significant as it is the first known incident of a 
right-wing extremist using a UAV in preparation 
or execution of an attack. Prior to this, the only 
similar known incident is that of German right-
wing extremists planning to use bomb-laden model 
airplanes to attack political adversaries in 2013.6 The 
primary non-state users of UAVs in the Middle East 
include the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and the 
Houthis in Yemen.7 This leads to the question: why 
have some violent groups adopted UAVs into their 
repertoire while others have not? 
According to Brian A Jackson, terrorist 
organisations do not innovate technologically for 
the sake of innovation, but because they believe 
that there is something to be gained by it. This 
The Right’s Time to Fly?
Exploring the Possibility of Right-Wing 
Extremists’ Use of UAVs
Håvard Haugstvedt
UAVs have been used by non-state actors in the past decade. However, no known attack by right-
wing extremists has been carried out using them. Håvard Haugstvedt reviews recent developments in 
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the capability to develop and use UAVs may be more possible than that which has been revealed thus 
far. Nonetheless, this article casts doubt on right-wing extremists’ capability and desire to incorporate 
UAVs into a violent repertoire that has historically been composed of fists, fires and firearms.
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innovation is dependent on a group’s desire to 
acquire new technologies, and the existence of 
technical and infrastructure capabilities.8 This 
article seeks to explore the possibility of right-
wing extremists adapting armed or unarmed UAVs 
by examining the use of other strategies, tools 
and tactics, and exploring the characteristics of 
groups that have used UAVs. Additionally, content 
from online forums and channels associated 
with right-wing extremism and prior research 
on how extremists and terrorists learn from one 
another is taken into account. Engaging with these 
perspectives and sources might reveal where 
this particular subject is heading and prepare 
security services and law enforcement agencies for 
potential future threats. 
8. Brian A Jackson, ‘Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private 
Sector Technology Adoption’, Studies in Confl ict and Terrorism (Vol. 24, No. 3, May 2001), pp. 183–213.
9. Seth G Jones, Catrina Doxsee and Nicholas Harrington, ‘The Escalating Terrorism Problem in the United States’,  CSIS 
Brief, June 2020.
10. Lois Beckett, ‘Anti-Fascists Linked to Zero Murders in the US in 25 Years’, The Guardian, 27 July 2020.
11. Christopher Wray, ‘FBI Oversight’, Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC, 5 February 2020.
Contemporary Right-Wing 
Extremist Violence
Right-wing extremists have been responsible for the 
majority of terror attacks in the US since the mid-
1990s. In the past six years, the number of attacks 
and plots from such actors has grown substantially, 
and accounted for 90% of all terror attacks from 
January to May 2020.9 In addition, right-wing 
extremist attacks accounted for 117 fatalities in the 
US, as opposed to 95 by jihadist extremists and 21 by 
left -wing extremists, since 2010.10 In February 2020, 
the FBI recognised racially motivated domestic 
violent extremists as a national threat, alongside 
homegrown extremists in general, and foreign 
terrorist organisations.11 In Western Europe, there 
Despite expressing some interest on the internet, right-
wing extremists have provided few indications that 
they are planning to use UAVs. Courtesy of Adobe Stock/
Naypong Studio
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were four violent attacks motivated by right-wing 
extremism in 2019 with fatal outcomes and at least 
112 severe but non-fatal attacks. From a long-term 
perspective, these numbers are relatively low, but 
2019 marks the second most deadly year out of 
the past six.12 Attacks were carried out by beating/
kicking victims and using knives or other blunt 
instruments in 71 of 116 incidents in 2019, while 
firearms or explosives were used in 25 incidents.13 
In the US, weapons used in right-wing terror attacks 
from 1994 to 2020 have mainly been incendiaries, 
explosives (such as Molotov cocktails and 
homemade bombs) and firearms.14 This indicates a 
low level of technological sophistication, possibly 
somewhat higher in the US than in Western Europe. 
While there are large online communities where 
right-wing extremists interact, physical attacks are 
predominantly carried out by so-called ‘lone actors’ 
against ethnic and religious minorities.15 
Right-Wing Adoption of Tools and 
Tactics
This section does not cover all of the tactics and 
tools used by right-wing extremists in acts of terror 
or violence, but rather sheds light on a few key 
contemporary aspects. Tarrant’s livestreaming of his 
Christchurch attack has inspired other right-wing 
extremists to do the same. This occurred during the 
El Paso, Halle and Bærum attacks the same year.16 
12. Jacob Aasland Ravndal et al., ‘RTV Trend Report 2020: Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe, 1990-
2019’, C-REX Research Report, No. 1, 2020.
13. Ibid.
14. Seth G Jones, Catrina Doxsee and Nicholas Harrington, ‘The Tactics and Targets of Domestic Terrorists’, CSIS 
Brief, July 2020.
15. Ravndal et al., ‘RTV Trend Report 2020’; Koehler, ‘Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe’; UN Security 
Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), ‘Member States Concerned by the 
Growing and Increasingly Transnational Threat of Extreme Right Wing Terrorism’, CTED Trends Alert, April 2020, 
<https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/news/2020/04/01/cted-launches-trends-alert-extreme-right-wing-terrorism/>, 
accessed 29 July 2020.
16. Ravndal et al., ‘RTV Trend Report 2020’; Graham Macklin, ‘The El Paso Terrorist Attack: The Chain Reaction of Global 
Right-Wing Terror’, CTC Sentinel (Vol. 12, No. 11, December 2019).
17. Gunnar J Weimann, ‘Competition and Innovation in a Hostile Environment: How Jabhat Al-Nusra and Islamic State Moved 
to Twitter in 2013–2014’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (Vol. 42, No. 1–2, February 2019), pp. 25–42.
18. Ari Weil, ‘Protesters Hit by Cars Recently Highlight a Dangerous Far-Right Trend in America’, NBC News, 12 July 2020; 
Vincent Miller and Keith J Hayward, ‘“I Did My Bit”: Terrorism, Tarde and the Vehicle Ramming Attack as an Imitative 
Event’, British Journal of Criminology (Vol. 59, No. 1, January 2019), pp. 1–23.
19. Holly Yan, ‘Vehicles as Weapons: Muenster Part of a Deadly Trend’, CNN, 7 April 2018.
20. Phil McCausland et al., ‘Charlottesville Rally Turns Deadly: One Killed After Car Strikes Crowd’, NBC News, 12 August 2017.
21. Weil, ‘Protesters Hit by Cars Recently Highlight a Dangerous Far-Right Trend in America’.
22. Simon Perry, Badi Hasisi and Gali Perry, ‘Who Is the Lone Terrorist? A Study of Vehicle-Borne Attackers in Israel and the 
West Bank’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (Vol. 41, No. 11, November 2018), pp. 899–913.
Prior to Christchurch, right-wing extremists had 
not communicated their actions in the same ways as 
militant Islamists. The latter have used common and 
fully open online platforms to intimidate opponents, 
attract new recruits and increase funding.17
Vehicle ramming attacks (VRAs) are another 
tactic used by right-wing extremists. In a review of 
cases in the Global Terrorism Database from 1999 
to 2017, 85% of VRAs in terrorist attacks occurred 
between 2014 and 2017, first in the Middle East, 
and later in North America and Western Europe.18 
The latter attacks in Western Europe, and the first 
attacks in North America, were associated with 
individuals who sympathise with or support the 
Islamic State. Examples of these attacks were those 
conducted in Barcelona, London, Nice and Berlin.19 
Vehicles as weapons for the far right reached public 
attention in the US in 2017 when a participant at the 
Charlottesville rally drove his car into protesters, 
killing one and wounding several others.20 
Additionally, from 27 May to 7 July 2020, 72 VRAs 
were recorded in the US.21 
An examination of these international cases 
reveals that they are mainly carried out by lone 
actors from a variety of backgrounds. In a study of 
62 cases from Israel and the West Bank, none of the 
VRAs were committed by terrorist organisations, 
and only 14.5% of perpetrators had previously 
engaged in acts of terrorism.22 In the US, many of the 
VRAs are carried out by right-wing extremists, but 
also by people from other backgrounds, and those 
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with less clear motivations.23 The surge in VRA cases 
in North America has coincided with the emergence 
of memes in far-right online environments that 
dehumanise protesters in the streets, who have 
‘given up their rights’.24 Strategies to dehumanise 
the ideological opponent are also used by jihadist 
groups to prepare their followers or soldiers for acts 
of degradation and violence towards their enemies.25
Groups That Have Adopted UAVs 
Into Their Repertoire
While contemporary right-wing extremists have 
yet to use UAVs for attacks, jihadist groups and 
other militant non-state actors have already done 
so. UAVs have primarily been adopted by non-state 
actors operating in the Middle East, such as Hamas, 
Hizbullah, the Islamic State, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham 
23. Weil, ‘Protesters Hit by Cars Recently Highlight a Dangerous Far-Right Trend in America’.
24. Ibid. Dehumanisation is a process of redefining a group or an individual as not human. A historical example of this is 
referring to people as ‘rats’ or ‘vermin’. This process may, for some, contribute to legitimising behaviour that otherwise 
would be considered immoral. For more on dehumanisation, see Albert Bandura, Bill Underwood and Michael E Fromson, 
‘Disinhibition of Aggression Through Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims’, Journal of Research in 
Personality (Vol. 9, No. 4, December 1975), pp. 253–69.
25. Simon Cottee, ‘The Pornography of Jihadism: What ISIS Videos and X-Rated Movies Have in Common’, The Atlantic, 
12 September 2014; Sara Hamad Alqurainy, Hamedi M Adnan and Abubakar Usman Abubakar, ‘The Road to the Slaughter: 
ISIS Process of Dehumanizing the Enemy’, Opcion (Vol. 35, No. 19, 2019), pp. 2757–74.
26. Alex Yang, ‘Eye in the Sky: The Militarization of Drones by Non-State Actors’, Penn Political Review, 8 November 2018; 
UN Security Council, ‘Full Military Incursion Would Overwhelm Ability to Respond, Officials Tell Security Council, 
Warning of Potential Catastrophe for 3 Million Syrians, 17 May 2019, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13812.doc.
htm>, accessed 20 July 2020; Don Rassler, ‘The Islamic State and Drones: Supply, Scale, and Future Threats’, Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point, July 2018.
27. Jared Keller, ‘The Taliban Have Been Using Drones to Watch US Troops “24/7” in Afghanistan’, Business Insider, 
14 December 2018; Uthman Abubakar, ‘Nigeria: Boko Haram Using Drones to Monitor Troops’ Operations - Borno 
Governor’, allAfrica, 31 July 2019, <https://allafrica.com/stories/201907310116.html>, accessed 29 May 2020; Scott Crino 
and Andy Dreby, ‘Drone Technology Proliferation in Small Wars’, Small Wars Journal, 2 October 2019; Steven Stalinsky 
and R Sosnow, ‘A Decade of Jihadi Organizations’ Use of Drones – From Early Experiments by Hizbullah, Hamas, and 
Al-Qaeda to Emerging National Security Crisis for the West as ISIS Launches First Attack Drones’, MEMRI, 21 February 2017, 
<https://www.memri.org/reports/decade-jihadi-organizations-use-drones-%E2%80%93-early-experiments-hizbullah-
hamas-and-al-qaeda>, accessed 13 April 2020.
28. Warsaw Institute, ‘New Russian Equipment for Pro-Russian Separatists in Donbas’, 22 August 2018, <https://warsawinstitute.
org/new-russian-equipment-pro-russian-separatists-donbas/>, accessed 1 July 2020; John P Sullivan, Robert J Bunker and 
David A Kuhn, ‘Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #38: Armed Drone Targets the Baja California Public Safety Secretary’s 
Residence in Tecate, Mexico’, Small Wars Journal, 6 August 2018.
29. Don Rassler, Muhammad Al-‘Ubaydi and Vera Mironova, ‘The Islamic State’s Drone Documents: Management, 
Acquisitions, and DIY Tradecraft’, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 31 January 2017, <https://ctc.usma.edu/ctc-
perspectives-the-islamic-states-drone-documents-management-acquisitions-and-diy-tradecraft/>, accessed 8 August 
2019; Dan Gettinger and Arthur Holland Michel, ‘A Brief History of Hamas and Hezbollah’s Drones’, 14 July 2014, 
<https://dronecenter.bard.edu/hezbollah-hamas-drones/>, accessed 22 April 2019.
30. Tyler Koslow, ‘Concerns Mount Over ISIS Making 3D Printed Bombs’, All3DP, 6 December 2016, <https://all3dp.com/3d-
printed-bombs-isis/>, accessed 11 August 2020; Kelsey D Atherton, ‘Ukraine Experiences the Future of War’, C4ISRNET, 
20 March 2019, <https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2019/03/20/ukraine-forces-encountered-3d-printed-drone-
bombs/>, accessed 8 August 2020.
and the Houthis.26 These groups have acquired 
armed UAVs in addition to the more widely available 
commercial types for reconnaissance. The latter has 
also been used by Al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, Boko Haram 
and Al-Shabaab.27 In addition, pro-Russian militias 
in Ukraine and Mexican drug cartels have used both 
armed and unarmed UAVs in their operations.28 
The use of UAVs by non-state actors has been 
publicly known since 2014, and especially so 
since 2016 when the Islamic State started refitting 
commercial UAVs with explosives in Iraq and Syria.29 
Research conducted on the actions of such groups 
has revealed evidence of 3D printing of some parts 
of the UAV itself, or parts fitted to the explosive being 
dropped from the UAV.30 While there is a case under 
criminal prosecution in the UK involving an Islamic 
State sympathiser who allegedly researched how to 
develop a commercial UAV for use in a terror attack, 
overwhelming evidence suggests that the use of 
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UAVs in terror plans or attacks are usually associated 
with larger organisations.31 
Earlier incorporation of UAVs into non-state 
groups appears dependent on key personnel with 
sufficient competency and skills in engineering 
or aviation, such as Hamas’s Mohamed Zaouari,32 
and the Islamic State’s Fadhel Mensi and Basil 
Hassan.33 In the case of Hizbullah and the Houthis, 
Iran appears to have filled this function. While the 
country has denied being involved in the Houthi UAV 
attacks on Saudi Arabia, evidence and indications 
of Iranian involvement have been identified in 
independent investigations of the components in 
the UAVs used by the Houthis.34 Importantly, the 
use of armed UAVs in attacks by non-state actors 
has almost exclusively occurred in active conflict 
zones in the Middle East.35 One incident worth 
noting as a deviation from this pattern is the failed 
UAV attack against Venezuelan President Nicolás 
Maduro in 2018.36
Online Activities
Extremists have been increasingly banned from 
established social media platforms such as Twitter 
and Facebook, and instead are migrating to 
Telegram37 and WhatsApp,38 which offer advanced 
encryption options, closed channels and the 
31. BBC News, ‘Terror Accused Hisham Muhammad “Was Planning Lone-Wolf Drone Attack”’, 28 July 2020.
32. BBC News, ‘Hamas Accuses Israel of Killing Its Tunisian Drone Expert’, 17 December 2016.
33. Almohammad and Speckhard, ‘ISIS Drones’; Mette Mayli Albæk et al., ‘The Controller: How Basil Hassan Launched 
Islamic State Terror into the Skies’, CTC Sentinel (Vol. 13, No. 5, May 2020), pp. 1–11.
34. UN Security Council, ‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen’, S/2020/70, 27 January 2020; Conflict Armament 
Research, ‘Evolution of UAVs Employed by Houthi Forces in Yemen’, February 2020, <https://www.conflictarm.com/
download-file/?report_id=3185&file_id=3189>, accessed 28 February 2020.
35. Håvard Haugstvedt and Jan Otto Jacobsen, ‘Taking Fourth-Generation Warfare to the Skies? An Empirical Exploration of 
Non-State Actors’ Use of Weaponised Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs—“Drones”)’, Perspectives on Terrorism (Vol. 14, 
No. 5, 2020), pp. 26–40.
36. Colin P Clarke, ‘Approaching a “New Normal”: What the Drone Attack in Venezuela Portends’, RAND Blog, 13 August 2018, 
<https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/08/approaching-a-new-normal-what-the-drone-attack-in-venezuela.html>, accessed 
19 October 2020.
37. Aleksandra Urman and Stefan Katz, ‘What They Do in the Shadows: Examining the Far-Right Networks on Telegram’, 
Information, Communication and Society (20 August 2020), DOI:10.1080/1369118X.2020.1803946.
38. Gordon Rayner, ‘WhatsApp Accused of Giving Terrorists “a Secret Place to Hide” as It Refuses to Hand Over London 
Attacker’s Messages’, The Telegraph, 26 March 2017.
39. Urman and Katz, ‘What They Do in the Shadows’.
40. Heidi Beirich, ‘White Homicide Worldwide: Stormfront, the Leading White Supremacist Web Forum, Has Another 
Distinction — Murder Capital of the Internet’, Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), SPLC Intelligence Report, Summer 2014.
41. Ted Barrett, Manu Raju and Peter Nickeas, ‘US Capitol Secured, 4 Dead After Rioters Stormed the Halls of Congress to 
Block Biden’s Win’, CNN, 6 January 2021.
42. Ben Collins and Brandy Zadrozny, ‘Extremists Made Little Secret of Ambitions to “Occupy” Capitol in Weeks Before 
Attack’, NBC News, 8 January 2021.
option to permanently delete posted material. The 
migration from Facebook to Telegram has resulted 
in a substantial audience reduction for right-wing 
extremists. However, what they have lost in potential 
numbers they might have gained in a decrease in 
transparency.39 
The author’s review of the scholarly literature, 
news reports and other sources indicated that 
these sources were not sufficient to reveal evidence 
of right-wing extremists using UAVs in plans, 
preparations or attacks. Therefore, a search of online 
discussion forums and channels was performed. 
This search aimed to identify discussions about 
procuring, refitting or modifying UAVs, or about how 
groups such as the Islamic State have done this in 
the past. 
Research on right-wing extremists has found 
indications of online activities prior to their use of 
violence.40 On 6 January 2021, the storming of Capitol 
Hill in Washington by QAnon supporters, right-
wing extremists and other anti-government militia 
appeared to come as a surprise to law enforcement, 
over-running the relatively small Capitol Police and 
resulting in the death of five people.41 However, 
this demonstration was not organised in the dark 
corners of the internet alone, but also on Facebook 
and Instagram.42 Among others, investigative 
journalists at Bellingcat have shown how forum 
discussions gave indications of what later unravelled 
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in Washington.43 This was also identified by the FBI 
prior to the attack.44 
Research on right-wing extremists in the UK 
shows that those who carried out acts of violence 
were significantly more likely to have learned tactics 
online compared with those who have not engaged 
in attacks, especially attacks against harder targets 
or when using more sophisticated tools, such as 
improvised explosive devices. Right-wing extremists 
are also more likely than their jihadist-inspired 
counterparts to engage in extreme online forums, as 
opposed to email and chat rooms.45 
Mattias Wahlström and Anton Törnberg argue 
that social media, in particular, has the capacity 
to create discursive opportunity structures for 
likeminded people, facilitate trans-local group 
dynamics, and offer effective ways of planning and 
coordinating activities, such as attacks.46 These 
three aspects are reflected in both the predictions 
for and the events leading to the storming of the 
Capitol on 6 January.47
An obvious challenge is distinguishing what is ‘just 
talk’ from that which might indicate actual planning, 
preparation or willingness to carry out violence 
motivated by right-wing extremism. However, the 
above shows that right-wing extremists do use 
forums and channels to communicate, and that 
those willing to carry out acts of violence might be 
more present on such forums, to learn and prepare. 
As such, searching for discussions about UAVs in 
the online realms of right-wing extremists has the 
potential to uncover indications of interest in UAVs 
by such groups. 
43. Bellingcat, ‘How the Insurgent and MAGA Right Are Being Welded Together on the Streets of Washington D.C.’, 
5 January 2021.
44. Devlin Barrett and Matt Zapotosky, ‘FBI Report Warned of “War” at Capitol, Contradicting Claims There Was No Indication 
of Looming Violence’, Washington Post, 13 January 2021.
45. Paul Gill et al., ‘Terrorist Use of the Internet by the Numbers: Quantifying Behaviors, Patterns, and Processes’, Criminology 
and Public Policy (Vol. 16, No. 1, 2017), pp. 99–117. 
46. Mattias Wahlström and Anton Törnberg, ‘Social Media Mechanisms for Right-Wing Political Violence in the 21st 
Century: Discursive Opportunities, Group Dynamics, and Co-Ordination’, Terrorism and Political Violence (4 April 2019), 
DOI:10.1080/09546553.2019.1586676.
47. Daniel L Byman and Colin P Clarke, ‘Why the Risk of Election Violence Is High’, Fixgov, a blog of the Brookings Institution, 
27 October 2020; Tina Nguyen and Mark Scott, ‘“Hashtags Come to Life”: How Online Extremists Fueled Wednesday’s 
Capitol Hill Insurrection’, Politico, 7 January 2021; Anti-Defamation League, ‘Extremists and Mainstream Trump Supporters 
Plan to Protest Congressional Certification of Biden’s Victory’, 4 January 2021, <https://www.adl.org/blog/extremists-and-
mainstream-trump-supporters-plan-to-protest-congressional-certification-of>, accessed 13 January 2021.
48. Endchan, 8chan and 8kun, among others, are message and imageboards with various ‘sub-channels’. Topics such as child 
pornography, white supremacism and violence have been found, and several of these sites have been shut down or filtered 
out from results in search engines. 
49. Urman and Katz, ‘What They Do in the Shadows’.
50. Stalinsky and Sosnow, ‘A Decade of Jihadi Organizations’ Use of Drones’.
Over 200 open channels on Telegram, as well as 
groups on imageboards such as Endchan and 8kun,48 
which are frequently used by those with right-wing 
extremist views, were searched manually through text 
queries (including ‘drone’, ‘UAV’, ‘UAS’ and others) 
and extensive ‘browsing’. Several German Telegram 
channels were found in Aleksandra Urman and 
Stefan Katz’s source material, and these were used 
in the search.49 While researchers have previously 
identified at least one invite-only Telegram channel 
where Islamic State members with technical degrees 
discussed the development of UAVs,50 the search for 
this led to only a few relevant posts being identified. 
These either described the significance of UAVs 
in modern warfare, or referred to incidents where 
UAVs were used in attacks in the Middle East. Some 
channels featured videos of UAV strikes in conflict 
zones in the Middle East and UAV concept models, 
and – in one case – a mock-up of a low-budget UAV 
using relatively accessible parts. However, the latter 
lacked any in-depth description of how to construct 
the UAV beyond the name and function of the parts 
in the image. In sum, the review of open forums and 
channels associated with right-wing extremists did 
not identify posts or discussions about using off-the-
shelf UAVs, adapting or modifying them.
Terrorist and Extremist Groups’ 
Learning
Terrorism through history is described by David C 
Rapoport as occurring in ‘waves’. According to Tom 
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Parker and Nick Sitter, it comes in ‘strains’.51 Regardless 
of the label given, history has demonstrated that 
terrorists observe, adapt and learn from one another 
and their adversaries. For example, James J F Forest 
has discussed how Al-Qa’ida learned strategies and 
tactics from Hizbullah, and vice versa.52 Another 
example of an organisational learning process is 
that of Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, which 
has learned from both Al-Qa’ida and government 
counterterrorism strategies.53 
VRA tactics used in the West Bank and Israel have 
been adopted and used in the US, particularly in the 
past couple of years, in what Mia Bloom describes 
as a migration of tactics from jihadists to right-wing 
extremists.54 Contemporary extremist and far-right 
groups have evolved from local, or national, to 
global networks and cross-border brotherhoods, 
resembling those of Islamic extremists.55 Right-
wing extremists have also been found to learn 
from the Islamic State’s bomb-making manuals, as 
well as their use of bomb-making videos in their 
own propaganda.56 Possibly more surprisingly, 
51. David C Rapoport, ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’, in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M Ludes (eds), Attacking 
Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), pp. 46–73; Tom Parker 
and Nick Sitter, ‘The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: It’s Not Waves, It’s Strains’, Terrorism and Political Violence (Vol. 28, 
No. 2, March 2016), pp. 197–216.
52. James J F Forest (ed.), Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2006).
53. Carolin Goerzig, ‘Terrorist Learning in Context – The Case of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’, Critical Studies on 
Terrorism (Vol. 12, No. 4, October 2019), pp. 629–48.
54. Mia Bloom, ‘Vehicle Ramming: The Evolution of a Terrorist Tactic Inside the US’, Just Security, 16 July 2020, <https://www.
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a writer affiliated with a neo-Nazi group, the 
Atomwaffen Division (AWD), wrote that the culture 
of martyrdom in groups such as the Islamic State 
and the Taliban is to be admired, urging young men 
to give their lives for their cause.57 The AWD has, 
as an exception among right-wing extremist groups, 
used UAVs in propaganda videos, displaying some 
level of professionalism in photography and video 
editing.58 In addition, in September 2019 the US 
Department of Justice charged two US citizens, who 
identified as members of the Boogaloo Bois,59 with 
attempting to provide weapons and suppressors to 
Hamas.60 According to the press release, the two 
were members of the sub-group Boojahideen, a 
lingustic spin-off of the name Mujahideen.61 These 
two examples of right-wing actors giving praise 
to, or collaborating with, militant Islamists might 
substantiate Assistant Attorney General John C 
Demers’s comments which described the arrest 
of the Boogaloo Bois ‘as a disturbing example of 




Recruiting Military or Law 
Enforcement Personnel
For extremist groups, former or active members of 
the armed forces or law enforcement are held in 
high regard as their training (close combat, tactical 
formations, use of surveillance techniques, handling 
explosives, counterintelligence) provides valuable 
knowledge and experience.63 Additionally, right-wing 
former or active service members are more likely to 
obtain weapons than their jihadist counterparts with 
a US military background.64 For these reasons and 
others, prior investigations have revealed that right-
wing extremists have actively recruited individuals 
with military backgrounds.65 The concern about 
right-wing extremism in the armed forces of Western 
countries has increased as a result of the following 
revelation: there is a worrying number of right-wing 
extremists in law enforcement66 and in the armed 
forces of the US, Canada and Germany, among 
others.67 Additionally, due to the growing number of 
right-wing extremists among its members, the KSK, 
a command unit of the German special forces, has 
been partially dissolved.68 As a concerning number 
of present or former military service members have 
been found to be involved in right-wing extremist 
groups, or sympathising with such groups, why 
have we not seen an increase in the use of UAVs for 
planning, preparation or execution of terror attacks?
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Concluding Remarks
The searches conducted in open forums and channels, 
all displaying graphic extremist propaganda, did not 
return substantial evidence of discussions related to 
UAVs among right-wing extremists. This does not 
necessarily imply that there is no evidence of such 
discussions taking place, and could mean that right-
wing extremists discuss weaponry and tactics, such 
as UAVs, offline or in closed or invite-only channels. 
Extremists and terrorist organisations observe 
and learn from others’ tactics, failures and 
successes. This might also be the case for right-
wing extremists considering UAVs. In addition, as 
3D printing becomes less expensive and knowledge 
might flow between organisations, the skills and 
parts necessary to modify a commercial-grade 
UAV into one with the capacity to place or drop 
explosives on to a target might become more 
available. The presented examples of group learning 
and inspiration suggest that the UAV tactics and 
strategies employed by, among others, the Islamic 
State and the Houthis might be under consideration 
by right-wing extremists. However, the groups that 
have acquired armed UAVs, particularly Hizbullah 
and the Houthis, stand out in terms of having a 
large regional state actor, Iran, supporting them.69 
Additionally, such attacks have been carried out 
almost exclusively in conflict zones.70 In the cases 
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of the Islamic State and Hamas, key personnel with 
aviation or engineering experience have provided 
each group with the competency and capacity to 
take its operations to the skies. As far as what is 
publicly known, right-wing extremist groups lack 
large entities, such as state actors, to support them 
in organisational and strategic development. This 
hurdle may be overcome by the unsettling support 
for such groups from former and current military 
and law enforcement personnel. This capacity may 
substitute for a state actor in terms of providing 
experience and know-how procured through active 
service, inside or outside conflict zones. As such, 
this tool might be closer to their grasp than what 
would be expected based on the evidence of their 
past plans or actions.
Law enforcement and 
security agencies should pay 
considerable attention to 
known right-wing extremists 
who display an interest in 
modifying commercial-grade 
UAVs
While there are a vast number of groups and 
organisations that fit into the far- and extreme-right 
spectrum, attacks are still predominately being 
carried out by lone actors or more unorganised 
groups, targeting government officials or minorities.71 
This might explain why ground, rather than aerial, 
vehicles are their weapons of choice: they are 
commonly available; preparing to use them does not 
provoke suspicion; and they have the capacity to 
inflict massive damage on their victims. The use of 
cars, not UAVs, fits the pattern of right-wing violence 
in its present and historical forms by being a tool that 
a lone actor can use without advanced training or 
preparation, as opposed to the more sophisticated 
UAV. This is also in line with the history of terrorism 
in general, where easy-to-produce, cheap and 
71. CTED, ‘Member States Concerned by the Growing and Increasingly Transnational Threat of Extreme Right Wing 
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72. Rapoport, ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’.
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portable weapons have been found to be the most 
attractive.72
By assessing their possible desire and capability, 
the findings in this article cast doubt on whether 
right-wing extremist groups are likely to use UAVs 
in their actions. However, if the migration of tools 
and tactics from militant Islamists to right-wing 
extremists persists, this might change. Large 
mobilisations of individuals and groups from across 
the US, as evidenced on 6 January, might indicate 
stronger organisational ties between US groups, and 
a better capability to pool knowledge and know-
how.
However, using a UAV entails potential 
disadvantages if spotted or actively communicated 
to the public, as was observed in right-wing attacks 
in 2019. As UAVs in the hands of terrorists have been 
deemed a potential security threat,73 an attack on 
government officials or opposing ideological groups 
outside conflict zones would likely set off pervasive 
government measures to identify and apprehend 
the responsible actors. UAVs, armed or unarmed, 
represent an increase in sophistication, and might 
therefore draw sufficient unwanted attention from 
law enforcement or security agencies to motivate 
right-wing extremists to keep their ‘boots on 
the ground’. If, however, mass communication 
of extremist ideology and actions is the goal – as 
observed several times during 2019 – UAVs 
represent an alarmingly effective tool to both 
execute and communicate right-wing terrorism to 
a global audience. 
Recommendations
The likelihood of right-wing extremists using 
armed UAVs in attacks is considered low. However, 
this might change as transnationality, cross-group 
connections and the knowledge pool grow, and as 
potential influence might come from groups with 
experience or the capability to modify and use UAVs. 
Taking into account the political situation in the US, 
where turmoil among Donald Trump supporters 
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reached a critical point at the storming of Capitol 
Hill, law enforcement and security agencies should 
pay considerable attention to known right-wing 
extremists who display an interest in modifying 
commercial-grade UAVs. Scrutiny should be 
directed towards those with experience in using 
such technology and/or explosives from previous 
military or law enforcement careers, or those with 
known ties to violent non-state actors who have 
previously used armed UAVs in attacks. n 
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